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The rapid increase in sophisticated Internet attacks has left the security industry 
lagging far behind.  In an attempt to improve network security, Therminator, a patternless 
intrusion detection system, was developed in 2001 by NPS in conjunction with NSA.  
The Therminator model uses statistical mechanics to analyze network traffic as a system 
of exchanges.  Being highly configurable enables Therminator to be adapted for any net-
work configuration. Until now, however, no exploration had been conducted on the con-
figuration parameters of the underlying statistical mechanics model.  It is important to 
understand the effects of these parameters to optimize anomaly detection. Thus the cur-
rent study explored these parameters using HTTP traffic generated in a controlled test 
environment.  Results were as follows: equations were developed for state counting to 
determine bucket state space sizes; bucket state space size was found to be symmetrical 
about the midpoint of the boundary conditions; proper display period was based on traffic 
rate; and lastly, the more orthogonal anomalous traffic was to the normal traffic, the lar-
ger the perturbation was in the state graph. These results provide needed insight into 
properly configuring Therminator for optimal anomaly detection, ultimately affording the 
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The proliferation of the Internet into society has brought with it unprecedented 
capabilities for information sharing, albeit at a significant cost.  The Internet now con-
nects multinational governments, commercial, private, and educational networks as an 
infrastructure of autonomous systems.  Originally developed as an educational tool, con-
nectivity and ease of use were emphasized over security, which has created a haven for 
abuse. From script kiddies to state sponsored professional hackers, this lack of robust se-
curity results in annual damages of hundreds of millions of dollars.  The rapid increase in 
sophisticated attacks has left the security industry lagging far behind.  In an attempt to 
improve network security, Therminator, a patternless intrusion detection system, was de-
veloped in 2001 by NPS in conjunction with NSA.  The Therminator model uses statisti-
cal mechanics to analyze network traffic as a system of exchanges.  This model is highly 
configurable, enabling Therminator to be adapted for any network configuration.   
Therminator provides a graphical representation of the network traffic flow.  
Anomalous activity appears as perturbations in the Therminator GUI.  The GUI consists 
of two major parts.  The upper graphic, dubbed the Thermal Towers, represents the aver-
age ball count in each bucket for each display period.  The lower graphic, dubbed the 
Thermal Canyon, represents the frequency of bucket states for each display period.   
Until now, however, no exploration had been conducted on the configuration pa-
rameters of the underlying statistical mechanics model.  It is important to understand the 
effects of these parameters to optimize anomaly detection. The main thrust of the study 
was to explore these configuration parameters to gain needed insight into properly con-
figuring Therminator for optimal anomaly detection, ultimately affording the Department 
of Defense greater network security.   
The current study explored these parameters using hypertext transfer protocol 
(HTTP) traffic generated in a controlled test environment.  A test network was developed 
around the Spirent Smartbits TeraMetrics traffic generator.  The system was capable of 
generating line speed traffic.  The traffic scheme used consisted of simple eight packet 
HTTP exchanges.  With all the traffic flowing in and out of the network, the traffic rate 
can be controlled by varying the number of users per second. 
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The first part of this study involved defining the bucket state space.  Equations 
were then developed for state counting to determine the size of bucket state space.  The 
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where n is the total number of buckets, i is the total number of balls, u is the upper limit 
of balls in a given bucket, and l is the lower limit of balls in a given bucket. 
This equation is necessary in understanding how to properly configure the Ther-
minator.  Next, the concept of a smoothing ratio was developed to define the averaging 
time for data within the Therminator statistical mechanics algorithm.  It was determined 
that a low smoothing ratio results in increased false positives and a high ratio results in 
increased false negatives. 
In exploring the SLIDELENGTH, it was determined that the display period, 
which is equal to the SLIDELENGTH, should be set based on the traffic rate.  A relation-
ship between the display period and traffic rate was not able to be empirically deter-
mined, but was found to be less than linear.  It was also determined that optimizing a sys-
tem for a reduced traffic rate would require a less than linear increase in the SLIDE-
LENGTH.  The WINDOWLENGTH would also increase, but not as much as the SLIDE-
LENGTH.  This results in a decrease in the smoothing ratio. 
It was determined that the SLIDELENGTH and WINDOWLENGTH settings af-
fect the bucket space as a system.  Not all systems will have even traffic distribution 
across the bucket space.  For situations with uneven traffic distributions, optimization can 
be achieved by changing the BUCKETSPACEINIT parameters.  The smallest grouping 
within a bucket space was determined to be a conversation group.  Uneven traffic distri-
butions within a conversation group could not be optimized by changing the 
BUCKETSPACEINIT parameters.  In this case, a bucket prioritization scheme must be 
used.  For uneven traffic distribution between conversation groups, optimization could be 
 xviii
achieved by changing the BUCKETSPACEINIT parameters.  In this case, non-
homogenous boundary conditions could optimize the system. 
In experiments conducted on varying the BUCKETSPACEINIT parameters, it 
was determined that reducing the size of the bucket state space had a similar effect as in-
creasing the traffic rate.  In addition, the size of the bucket state space was symmetrical 
about the midpoint of the boundary conditions, assuming homogeneity across the bucket 
space with respect to the BUCKETSPACEINIT parameters.  Last, a translation property 
was discovered with the BUCKETPSACEINIT parameters.  Two BUCKETSPACEINIT 
parameter sets were equivalent if one was a scalar translation of the other. 
Lastly, the idea of orthogonal traffic was developed.  The ability to detect anoma-
lous traffic was determined to be based on the quantity of packets and their orientation to 
the normal traffic flow.  The more anomalous packets received and/or the more orthogo-
nal the traffic is to the normal traffic, the larger the perturbation in the Therminator GUI 
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The development of a secure and dependable networked computer infrastructure 
is dependent upon real-time detection of anomalous events and behaviors.  These events 
and behaviors are typically propagated over a network from source host to victim host.  
Today, most networks are linked together forming a system dubbed the Internet.  The 
Internet was originally intended to be a tool for research and education, not an inter-
national matrix of commercial, private, government, and educational systems.  With this 
in mind, the protocols governing its operation were originally designed for flexibility and 
connectivity, not security [1].   
Several approaches to intrusion detection have been studied and applied in prac-
tice with varying effects.  The earliest intrusion detection systems (IDS) integrated signa-
ture-based analysis for detection with normal network models [2].  Since then, many dif-
ferent systems have been based on the same assumption that malicious network activity is 
inherently different than normal network activity.  This is especially true of signature-
based IDS, which compare real events to known malicious or abnormal events.  The 
weakness of these types of systems is poor detection of new attacks, variations of known 
attacks and attacks that are similar to normal activity.  Attacks with explicit syntactic sig-
natures are easily detectable, but many attacks are much more subtle.  In addition, ambi-
guities in network protocols can lead to attacks that subvert signature-based IDS and 
launch undetectable insertion and evasion attacks [3, 4].   
As attackers have become stealthier and more savvy, the incidents and scope of 
denial or service (DoS) attacks has increased dramatically.  This includes widespread at-
tacks from network worms.  A worm is a small program that infects a host computer, rep-
licates itself, and then exploits the host’s network connection to infect other hosts [5].  
This results in two major problems, network denial of service from the exponential repli-
cation and the possibility of a malicious payload infecting the attacked hosts.  In 2001, 
the Code Red worm propagated to over 359,000 Internet hosts in less than 14 hours [6].  
Two years later, the slammer worm propagated to over 75,000 hosts in less than 30 min-
1 
utes, 90 percent of these in the first 10 minutes [7].  The scope of DoS resulting from 
worm attacks is quick and widespread, even global, in nature.  The Computer Security 
Institute’s 2003 Computer Crime and Security Survey reported that 82% of respondents 
had been a victim of a virus attack and 42% a DoS attack in the last year.  Reported 
losses for both types of attacks reached nearly $100 million [8].  
Current network security mechanisms are inadequate for handling the threat posed 
by a worm attack.  It has been argued that automated containment of self-propagating 
code is more likely to be successful than prevention or treatment mechanisms [9].  Suc-
cessful containment mechanisms require early and rapid detection of network and host 
threats.  This type of approach emphasizes process rather than user monitoring.  Mitigat-
ing propagation speed of worm attacks depends on accurate and efficient monitoring of 
host-based and network-based events for anomalous behaviors. 
The Therminator model formally characterizes the conversations between a large 
number of interacting entities in a computer network.  Capturing the distributions of con-
versation flow rates and sizes between network nodes is fundamental to the model.  The 
primary problem for early network attack detection is efficient data reduction that accu-
rately and rapidly distinguishes between normal and anomalous activity in the presence 
of an overwhelming amount of data related to network conversation flow.  The Thermi-
nator’s data reduction and anomaly detection model surpasses aggregate statistical mod-
els to provide a holistic view of conversation exchange dynamics and anomalous devia-
tions from the normal baseline.  This holistic view of network conversation rates and 
flows supports early containment strategies for worms by providing indication of anoma-
lous events leading to DoS.  The Therminator model provides rapid early detection and 




 The Therminator model spawned out of a directive issued by the National Secu-
rity Agency to solve the network security problem.  The model used by Therminator was 
the brainchild of Dr. Dave Ford who developed it while working for NSA.  The original 
version of Therminator (version 1), dubbed Thermonator was written in PERL.  The pro-
gram was tested at the Pacific Command’s NOC in early 2001.  During these tests, 
Thermonator was evaluated by a team from NSA.  The evaluation concluded Thermona-
tor would not detect typical attacks with the exception of attacks resulting in significant 
changes in the traffic flow [10].  This first version of Therminator had rudimentary 
graphs displaying the energy and entropy associated with the network traffic flow.  The 
notion of state was not integrated into this version, thus hampering the ability to detect 
anomalous activity. 
 In the spring of 2001, Dr. Ford requested the assistance of Dr. John McEachen at 
the Naval Postgraduate School.  Dr. McEachen sent two students, LT Steve Donald and 
Capt. Robert McMillen, to assist Dr. Ford with the project.  Fifty-two days later, a com-
pletely redesigned version of Therminator (version 2) was completed.  This version was 
coded in the C programming language and included a third-party 3D graphical overlay.  
To date, version 2 is the base for all later versions of Therminator.  This version incorpo-
rated the notion of “state”, which is essential to the statistical mechanical core model.   
 Therminator has been through several revisions since version 2, each adding in-
creased capability.  The version of Therminator that is used in this thesis is a modified 
version 3.  The core model is identical to version 2, with minor cosmetic and functional-
ity improvements.  The Therminator program is infinitely configurable, which results in 
difficulty configuring it properly.  The purpose of this thesis was to explore two major 




  In the hostile environment of today’s networks, monitoring and anomaly detection 
are necessary mechanisms for ensuring a secure and dependable computing infrastruc-
ture.  The Therminator Patternless Intrusion Detection System was designed to fill the 
gap between required security and commercially available IDS.  The next chapter of this 
thesis focuses on explaining the concepts behind the Therminator model, specifically re-
lating to statistical mechanics.  The third chapter defines the concept of state as it related 
to bucket states and bucket state space.  This chapter provides equations for calculating 
the size of the bucket state space given a set of boundary and initial conditions.  The 
fourth chapter explains the setup of the test network used to generate the traffic for each 
of the experiments.  Chapter five explores the configuration parameters of 
SLIDELENGTH, WINDOWLENGTH, and the smoothing ratio.  Numerous experiments 
were conducted to determine the effects of these parameters on the performance of the 
system.  Chapter six explores the BUCKETSPACEINIT configuration parameters.  
Again, numerous experiments were conducted to determine the effects of these parame-
ters on the performance of the system.  The last part of this chapter relates to optimizing a 
system with unequal traffic distribution by employing non-homogeneous boundary con-
ditions across the buckets.  Chapter seven contains information on constructing BUCK-
ETSPACEs.  This information is derived from observation made during the experiments 
in Chapters five and six.   Chapter seven provides a summary of the thesis and sugges-





II. THERMINATOR OVERVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter explains the basic concept behind the Therminator.  It describes the 
statistical mechanical model and how it is used to develop useful information about net-
work traffic.  The Therminator GUI is explained including the Thermal Towers and 
Thermal Canyon graphs. 
B. CONCEPT 
A network is basically a collection of complex interacting systems, with network 
traffic being the mode of exchange between these systems.  The purpose of Therminator 
is to allow for accurate detection of anomalous network activity through the reduction of 
standard network data into a meaningful and useful form [11].  This is accomplished us-
ing classic statistical mechanics.  Specifically, the rich, detailed information that can be 
collected about conversation participants in a network can be used to categorize the con-
versation participants.  The exchanges between these categories can then be observed and 
analyzed to yield a meaningful description of network state.   
In the Therminator model, the categories, or conversation groups, are called buck-
ets and the exchanges between the groups are called balls.  A state is defined as the num-
ber of balls in each and every bucket at any given time.  The state, or bucket state con-
cept, is further defined in Chapter III.  By using the notion of a macroscopic state, the 
thermodynamic principles of energy, entropy, and temperature can be developed.  This 
thesis focuses on the statistical mechanics and not the developed thermodynamics proper-
ties of the network traffic.  See Reference [11] for a detailed explanation of the develop-
ment of the thermodynamic properties. 
As packets traverse the network, they cause balls to move between the buckets.  
Each packet results in the movement of a ball, and thus a new state.  Each visited state is 
recorded for a given time period.  This produces a “random walk” of the states; see Ref-
erence [12] for a detailed explanation and example.  Typically, normal network traffic 
follows the same general walk.  People tend to perform the same types of network activi-
ties each day and thus the set of exchanges is finite and follows a relatively normal pat-
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tern.  When a new or unusual exchange occurs, this causes one of two events.  Either new 
states are visited that are not normally seen, or normally visited states are visited more 
often.  Both scenarios result in an anomaly in the state walk. 
For an example of this behavior, take a school of fish swimming through the 
ocean.  Let each point in the ocean represents one possible state, with repetition, from a 
finite set of states.  The fish tend to stay in a finite space, the school size, as they swim 
around.  The school size represents the total observed states for a given time period.  As 
the school swims along, all the fish follow the same path, the random walk.  The path 
represents the change of observed states from one period to the next.  When a predator 
approaches the school, the fish scatter, thus increasing the total observed states for that 
time period.  This causes the anomaly in not only the walk, but the state size.  When the 
predator leaves, the fish return to their original school size, less some unlucky fish, and 
continue along the random walk. 
 C. GUI 
The Therminator GUI, pictured in Figure 1, is broken into two major parts.  The 
upper graphic, dubbed the Thermal Towers, represents the average ball count in each 
bucket for each display period.  The lower graphic, dubbed the Thermal Canyon, repre-
sents the frequency of bucket states for each display period.  The Therminator program 
does have several other graphs associated with it, but those will not be explored in this 
thesis.   
The goal of the Therminator GUI was to provide the operator a visual representa-
tion of the network traffic.  Properly configured, the Therminator GUI provides insight 
into the “health” of the network.  Just as a sonar display provides insight into the ocean 




Figure 1 A screenshot of the Therminator GUI. The top half is the Thermal Towers 
associated with the number of balls in each bucket.  The lower half is the Thermal 
Canyon associated with the frequency of bucket states. 
1. Thermal Towers 
The Thermal Towers graph lends insight into gross shifts in network traffic flow.  
A more detailed view of the Thermal Towers graph is shown in Figure 2.   In the Thermal 
Towers graph, the x-axis defines time, the y-axis defines average ball count, and each 
colored bar along the z-axis represents a different bucket.  The Thermal Towers graph 
allows the viewer to see changes in the average ball count from time period to time pe-
riod.  Generally the bars are ordered, based on average ball count, in a decreasing manner 
along the positive z-axis. 
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Figure 2 A screenshot example of the Thermal Towers.  The x-axis represents time.  
The y-axis represents ball count.  The z-axis represents different buckets. 
2. Thermal Canyon 
The Thermal Canyon graph lends insight into significant changes in the total 
number of unique states as well as significant changes in the total number of times a 
unique state is seen.  A more detailed view of the Thermal Canyons graph is shown in 
Figure 3.   In the Thermal Canyon graph, the x-axis defines time, the y-axis defines the 
number of times a state was seen, and each data point on the z-axis represents a unique 
state.  The Thermal Canyon graph allows the viewer to see changes in the most probabil-
istic state(s) for any given time period.  Color bands are used to distinguish ranges of 
state counts on the y-axis.  These color bands make it easier to visually distinguish be-
tween significant changes in the number of times certain states are seen.  All states are 
ordered, based on number of occurrences during the display period, in a decreasing man-
ner along the positive z-axis. 
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Figure 3 A screen shot example of the Thermal Canyon.  The x-axis represents 
time.  The y-axis represents bucket state count.  The z-axis represents different 
bucket states. 
D.  SUMMARY 
Therminator was developed as a new approach to detecting anomalous network 
activity.  The project was developed to enable a user to get an indication of the “health” 
of the network by viewing two main graphs.  Each graph provides insight into different 
characteristics of the network traffic flow.  Therminator was designed to give operators a 
course overview of the network.  The ability to detect anomalies is dependent upon the 
operator’s aptitude for recognizing perturbations in the graphs.  Humans are good at pat-
tern recognition; so, the more pronounced the response to an anomalous event, the more 
likely the operator will detect it.  Therminator was meant to be used in conjunction with 
other security tools, not replace them.  In the next chapter, the concept of bucket state is 
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III. STATES  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter defines the concepts of bucket state and bucket state space.  The 
chapter then goes on to explain state counting and presents a number of equations to 
count the bucket states in a given bucket state space given a set of initial and boundary 
conditions. 
B. BUCKET STATE AND BUCKET STATE SPACE 
A bucket state is comprised of a set of n numbers, where n represents the total 
number of buckets in the system.  Each number in the set represents the number of balls 
in the associated bucket at a given period in time.  A representation of a bucket state is 
given by { }1 2, ,..., nc c c .  The collection of allowable states forms the bucket state space. 
C. STATE COUNTING 
The bucket state space includes an initial distribution of balls among the buckets.  
This distribution defines the initial state, or initial condition for the bucket state space. 
Finding the total number of bucket states is a counting problem using repetition [13].  For 
a system comprised of k balls, the total number of possible bucket states, N, is given by 











where the initial number of balls in each bucket is the same.  The special case of k as the 
total number of buckets, n, multiplied by the initial number of balls in each bucket, i, is 
given by 
 k n= ∗ . (4.2) 
An example of a bucket space is depicted in Figure 4.  Ignoring the boundary 
conditions and applying Equation (4.1) to the system results in a total of 969 bucket 
states. 
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Min (l) =  1
Init (k) = 4
? ?
?
1 2 3 4
 
Max (u) = 10
Figure 4 
1
An example of a bucket space.  In this case the bucket space is predicated 
by two decisions.  The white numbers represent the bucket number.  The initial 
bucket state is { . 4, 4,4,4}
For adherence to statistical mechanics assumptions, the allowable bucket states 
are bounded [1].  The boundary conditions are set for each individual bucket in the form 
of a minimum allowed ball count, l, and a maximum allowed ball count, u.  The total al-
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By applying the lower limit on the buckets, in the example above, the total number 
bucket states is reduced to 455. 
( 1)l =
Determining the effect of the upper limits on the bucket space is much more diffi-
cult.  By subtracting out the states that violate an upper boundary condition from Equa-
tion (4.1), we have   
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This assumes that each bucket has the same upper limit.  Applying Equation (4.5) to the 
example above, with an upper limit (u) of ten, reduces the total number of bucket states to 
745. 
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Applying the boundary conditions defined in the example above, the total number of 
buckets states is further reduced to 415. 
In order to determine the total allowable bucket states, given unique boundary 
conditions and initial conditions for each bucket results in   
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In these equations, ij and lj represent the initial number of balls and the minimum number 
of balls for the j-th bucket respectively.   The maximum allowed balls in a given bucket is 
represented by uj. 
D.  SUMMARY 
Bucket states are the basic building block from which the Thermintor GUIs are 
derived.  Understanding the expected bucket state space and the total number of possible 
bucket states, for a given configuration, is important for proper Therminator configura-
tion and interpretation.  The role of total bucket states will be developed in the Chapter V.  
This chapter also defined equations for determining the total possible bucket states under 
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IV. TEST NETWORK 
A.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, the design and setup of the test network used to perform all of the 
experiments is described.  This includes the equipment used, network topology, and traf-
fic composition. 
B.  TEST NETWORK DESCRIPTION 
All experiments were run from traffic generated on the test network depicted in 
Figure 5.  This test network was used so that the traffic characteristics could be closely 
controlled and reproduced. 
The network was intended to simulate a medium sized network, dubbed the 
trusted network, connected to the Internet and untrusted networks.  For traffic generation, 
a Spirent SMB-6000B chassis [14] with five LAN-3302A TeraMetrics modules [15] 
were used.  The LAN-3302A Ethernet modules are capable of generating millions of si-
multaneous TCP/IP connections at full line rate.  In conjunction with the Avalanche SMB 
software [16], the system can simulate millions of clients and servers on multiple subnets, 
thus generating realistic Internet conditions and load.  The software provides for the 
simulation of numerous layer 2-7 protocols, including HTTP, which was mainly used for 
this research.  The behavior of the servers and clients is also fully configurable with the 
Avalanche SMB software.  The only exception is the distribution of clients between the 
trusted and untrusted networks.  The program uses a round robin technique to assign cli-
ents to the different subnets.  This lack of functionality can be overcome by configuring 
more subnets for untrusted clients than trusted clients in the desired distribution ratio.  




Figure 5 A schematic of the test network.  The network is comprised of a trusted 
and untrusted side, divided by two routers.  The core of the traffic generation is a 
Spirent Smartbits traffic generator. 
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The test network was divided in two by a pair of Cisco 2600 routers, one acting as 
the trusted network’s gateway or edge device and the other as the first hop in the Internet.  
The traffic passing through the routers is captured and sent to the Therminator IDS.  Two 
routers were used, as opposed to one, to provide a more realistic simulation of a net-
work’s connection to the Internet, since most networks consist of more than one router.  
By using two routers, network packets addressed to non-existent machines will be passed 
into the network.  Typically it is the last hop router that generates the destination host un-
reachable ICMP error, thus using two routers at the gateway ensures that invalid traffic 
passes through the capture point.  A Cisco Catalyst 4000 switch, partitioned into four 
VLANs, was used for connecting multiple inputs to each router interface.  The uses of 
each VLAN are outlined in Table 1. 
VLAN Description Network Use 
VLAN1 Control network 192.168.200.0/24 Used for administrative control of all devices in the test network 
VLAN2 Trusted Network 172.16.0.0/16 
Simulated medium sized net-
work connected to the Internet 
(single autonomous system) 
VLAN3 Untrusted Network 10.0.0.0/8 
Simulated any number of un-
trusted networks connected to 
the Internet (multiple autono-
mous systems) 
VLAN4 Internet 192.168.100.0/24 
Simulated Internet (connecting 
autonomous systems) and pro-
vides capability for mirroring 
network traffic entering and ex-
iting the trusted network 
Table 1 A table containing the test network VLAN descriptions including network 
address and purpose 
The Avalanche SMB software allows each LAN-3302A module to be configured 
as either Web Avalanche (clients) or Web Reflector (servers).  The trusted network was 
broken into four subnets – two for servers and two for clients.  The untrusted network(s) 
also consisted of four subnets broken down in the same fashion.  The configuration of 
each of the five LAN-3302A modules and associated subnets can be seen in Table 2.   
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Module # Sofware Network Subnet Clients/Servers
(0,0,0) 25.0.10.0/24 198 Servers 
(0,0,1) Web Reflector 25.0.20.0/24 198 Servers 
(0,1,0) 25.1.0.0/16 199 Clients 
(0,1,1) Web Avalanche 
Untrusted
25.2.0.0/16 199 Clients 
(0,2,0) 172.16.10.0/24 5 Servers 
(0,2,1) Web Reflector 5 Servers 
(0,5,0) SmartWindow 172.16.20.0/24 1 Server 
(0,3,0) 172.16.100.0/24 50 Clients 
(0,3,1) Web Avalanche 
Trusted 
172.16.200.0/24 50 Clients 
Table 2 A table containing the configuration information for the five LAN-3302A 
modules used in the Spirent Smatbits traffic generator. 
The module numbers are based on location in the SMB-6000B chassis.  The first 
number is the chassis number, 0 in this case, since chassis can be daisy chained together.  
The second number is the slot in the chassis, starting with 0 in the upper left corner and 
counting across, row by row.  The third number is the port number on a given module.  
Each module has two 10/100 Base-TX ports, labeled from left to right starting at 0. 
SmartWindow [17] is a virtual front panel for the LAN-3302A modules that al-
lows for custom packet generation and insertion.  Module (0,5,0) was used for generation 
and injection of anomalous packets into the trusted network. 
C.  SUMMARY 
All experiments were performed using traffic generated by a test network.  The 
test network allowed for close control over the type of traffic generated.  It also provided 
a means for reproducing the same type of traffic for multiple trials, in order to compare 
the results of different configuration changes.  The next chapter contains experiments that 
explore the SLIDELENGTH and WINDOWLENGTH configuration parameters. 
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V. CONFIGURATION – SLIDELENGTH AND 
WINDOWLENGTH 
A.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, the results of numerous experiments that explore the 
SLIDELENGTH (SL) and WINDOWLENGTH (WL) configuration parameters will be 
discussed.  The concept of the smoothing ratio will be defined and explored.  The ex-
periments include determining the optimum traffic rate for a given set of configuration 
parameters and the effects of varying the SL, WL, and smoothing ratio.  Another set of 
experiments explored configuration for a traffic rate outside the optimal range.  The last 
set of experiments looked at the effect of unequal traffic distribution among buckets. 
B.  INTRODUCTION 
Two key configuration parameters are the SL and the WL.  The SL is defined as 
the time, in seconds, used for one display period.  The WL is the total period of time, in 
seconds, that data is averaged over.  For example, a SL of two means that data is col-
lected in two second intervals with each display increment representing two seconds.  
With a WL of ten, those two seconds of data would be averaged over ten seconds, or five 
SLs.  An example can be seen in Figure 6.     
In this example, the SL is the difference between time marks.  The WL is the dif-
ference between the start and finish of a box.  Using this example, the data displayed at 
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Figure 6 A graphic showing the relationship between the SL and WL.  The SL is 
the distance between any two time periods.  The WL is the distance spanned by 
any bar. 
C.  SMOOTHING RATIO 
The number of display periods that a given set of data will be averaged over is 
called the smoothing ratio (SR).  The value of SR is calculated as   
  WSR = . (6.1)  INDOWLENGTH
SLIDELENGTH
The SR is analogous to a simple filter.  The purpose of a filter is to reduce un-
wanted oscillations in a system.  In this case, the SR reduces the noise generated by a 
single event by averaging it over a set time period.  The SR must be set properly for a 
graph to reveal any useful information.  A large ratio will tend to hide anomalies (false 
negatives), where a small ratio will result in normal traffic appearing anomalous (false 
positives).   
An example of a small smoothing ratio, SR, equal to one, can be seen in Figure 7 
(a) and (b).  These graphs are very rough, with most activity looking anomalous.  An ex-
ample of a high smoothing ratio, SR equal to fifty, can be seen in Figure 7 (c) and (d).  In 
these graphs, all of the useful information has been smoothed out.  It would be nearly im-
possible to see any anomalous activity in these graphs.  Last, the set of graphs in Figure 7 
(e) and (f), the SR is set at ten.  This has the effect of filtering out the unwanted noise, 









Figure 7 Screen shots of Therminator graphs depicting the effects of various 
smoothing ratios – (a)  Thermal Towers with SR = 1, (b) Thermal Canyon with 
SR = 1, (c) Thermal Towers with SR = 50, (d) Thermal Canyon with SR = 50, (e) 
Thermal Towers with SR = 10, (f) Thermal Canyon with SR = 10 
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D.  SLIDELENGTH AND WINDOWLENGTH 
The SL controls how long a display period is, thus controlling how many new 
packets are analyzed per display period (new packet count).  The total number of new 
packets analyzed per display period (Tnp) is given by 
 
 ( )np pT R SLIDELENGTH= , (6.2) 
 
where Rp is the packet rate of the network. 
The WL controls how long data is averaged over, or the total number of packets 
analyzed per display period (absolute packet count).  The total number of packets ana-
lyzed per display period (Tp) is given by 
 




  =       
 ( )pR WINDOWLENGTH= .  (6.3) 
 
The SL and WL must be set properly in order to obtain a sufficient amount of 
traffic per display period to give any meaningful results.  In order to determine a guide-
line for proper setting of these parameters, a series of experiments were run.  Both the SL 
and WL can be found in the <name>.config file for the Therminator executable PID5.  
Appendix A contains an example of each of the Therminator configuration files. 
E.   RATE EXPERIMENT 
The first experiment was run using the parameters shown in Table 3.   
SLIDELENGTH WINDOWLENGTH Smoothing Ratio BucketSpaceInit 
1 second 10 seconds 10 0/10 : 4 
Table 3 A table containing the configuration parameters for the rate experiment 
The traffic rate was varied in order to determine how the system reacted to the various 
traffic rates.  The traffic was composed of simple HTTP transactions, each consisting of 




Figure 8 A screen shot of an Ethereal capture showing a typical HTTP packet ex-
change generated by the test network.  The exchange consists of eight packets. 
By setting the load parameter in the Avalanche SMB software to users per second, 
the traffic rate could be controlled.  Using a constant of 8 packets per user per second, 
any traffic rate could be supplied by adjusting the number of users per second.  This pro-
duced a constant packet rate with less than three percent standard deviation.  Each user 
that is created will perform one transaction, similar to that shown in Figure 8.  Since each 
transaction lasts approximately 3 ms, each user exits for only 3 ms. 
A simple bucket space definition was used which is depicted in Figure 9.  The 
system consisted of six buckets.   
 
Figure 9 A screen shot of the Therminator bucket space definition used in all ex-
periments.  The bucket space consists of six buckets. The “!” represents a nega-
tion.  Services represent port numbers less than 1024.  
The blue bucket represents the category of web servers within the trusted network using 
services ports – ports less than 1024.  The red bucket represents non-services ports, 
ephemeral, on web servers within the trusted network.  The Magenta bucket represents 
trusted clients service ports and the yellow bucket represents ephemeral ports on trusted 
clients.  The dark orange bucket represents service ports on hosts in the untrusted net-
work.  Last, the green bucket represents ephemeral ports on untrusted hosts.  
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For the purpose of this experiment, the test traffic only causes balls to move be-
tween the green and blue buckets as well as the yellow and dark orange buckets.  The 
traffic rates between these two bucket pairs should be equally distributed as the Ava-
lanche SMB software evenly populates the trusted and untrusted subnets using a round 
robin algorithm.   
Given that there are two sets of buckets with balls moving only within each set.  
The total number of possible states can be determined by using the BucketSpaceInit pa-
rameters in Table 3 with Equations (4.7) and (4.8).  In this case, the total number of 
buckets is 2, one bucket pair.  The results should be squared to account for both bucket 
pairs.  This results in 81 total possible states.  The Thermal Canyon can display 100 
unique states before the states begin to run off the end of the display. 
Each experiment shows a single packet anomaly that is orthogonal to the normal 
traffic flow.  This causes a ball to move from the red to the dark orange bucket.  By add-
ing a ball to the orange bucket, the total possible states are increased to 90.  Given that 
the data is carried for 10 display periods, there are actually 171 possible states that can be 
seen during a WL of time after the anomaly. 
The comments and conclusions drawn from these experiments are valid for the 
given bucket space definition in Figure 9 and the configuration parameters in Table 3.  
The results of changing these parameters are explored in Chapter VI. 
For this experiment, the traffic rate was varied from 250 packets per second (pps) 
to 10 kpps.  With a SL of 1 second, the new packet count per display period is equal to 
the traffic rate.  The absolute packet count per display period is equal to 10 times the traf-
fic rate; see Equation (6.3).   
A traffic rate of 250 pps produces a graph that is difficult to read due to the low 
traffic rate.  Each exchange weighs heavily upon the graph causing a steep ramping effect 
as seen Figure 10(a).  The ramping effect is caused by the SR.  With the low traffic rate, 
there are a small number of state changes and each state change is averaged over an SR 
number of display periods.  In this case, the SR actually creates “noise”.  The Low traffic 
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rate also causes only a small percentage of the total states to be visited as seen in Figure 
10(b). 
Doubling the traffic rate improves the graph dramatically, but it is still very 
rough, as shown in Figure 10(c).  This rough nature is caused by the ramping effect as 
seen in Figure 10(a), but with the higher traffic rate, only a partial ramp is allowed to de-
velop.  The added noise in the system is thus reduced from that of the previous traffic 
rate.  The traffic rate is not high enough to see a large percentage of the possible states 
visited in the Thermal Canyon, thus Figure 10(d) does not produce much useful informa-
tion. 
At 1 kpps, the Thermal Towers begin to show useful information about the con-
versation groups.  The graph is still rough, as shown in Figure 10(e), but has smoothed 
out considerably.  The graph is still hard to interpret due to the excess noise present in the 












Figure 10 Screen shots of the rate experiment results – (a) Thermal Towers at 250 
pps, (b) Thermal Canyon at 250 pps, (c) Thermal Towers at 500 pps, (d) Thermal 
Canyon at 500 pps, (e) Thermal Towers at 1 kpps, (f) Thermal Canyon at 1k pp. 
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As the traffic rate reaches 2 kpps, the graphs became smoother and easier to inter-
pret.  The conversation groups are easily distinguished in the Thermal Towers shown in 
Figure 11(a).  The number of states visited has reached a level that small perturbations in 
the normal traffic flow are readily apparent as shown in Figure 11(b).  A traffic rate of 2 
kpps rate marks the low end of the desirable traffic rate for proper performance. 
With a traffic rate of 3 kpps, the conversation groups in the Thermal Towers are 
very easy to distinguish as the graph has smoothed out significantly.  This is depicted in 
Figure 11(c).  As a high percentage of the possible states are now being visited, the 
Thermal Canyon graph yields rich information, as shown in Figure 11(d).  The single 
packet anomaly almost doubles the number of visited states.  This produces a perturba-
tion in the graph that is easy to detect.  A traffic rate of 3 kpps marks the high end of the 
desirable traffic rate for proper performance. 
As the traffic rate was increased past 3 kpps, the system became overly smooth 
and the conversation groups disappear, as shown in Figure 11(e).  At these traffic rates, 
nearly all of the states are visited each display period, and then averaged over the entire 
WL.  This results in very little change in the average ball count of a given bucket from 
display period to display period.  The Thermal Canyon, shown in Figure 11(f), is ex-
tremely smooth as the same number of unique states is visited in each display period.  
The single packet anomaly is still easy to distinguish, but more subtle network fluctua-
tions are lost.  As the traffic continues to increase, the system approaches complete satu-
ration.  At this point, every possible state is visited each display period.  At these high 










Figure 11 Screen shots of the rate experiment results – (a) Thermal Towers at 2 
kpps, (b) Thermal Canyon at 2 kpps, (c) Thermal Towers at 3 kpps, (d) Thermal 
Canyon at 3 kpps, (e) Thermal Towers at 5 kpps, (f) Thermal Canyon at 5 kpps 
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1. Conclusions 
From this first experiment, it is apparent that a traffic rate of 2 – 3 kpps is desir-
able for proper operation, given the configuration parameters in Table 3.  In order to ap-
ply this as a general configuration rule, there are a few questions that must first be ex-
plored.   
1. Is the desired traffic rate based on the new packet count for each display period 
(SL) or on the absolute packet count (WL)?   
2. Is this rate valid for different SR values? 
3. Do the SL and WL parameters scale appropriately to produce an effective graph 
at lower/higher traffic rates? 
F. RATIO EXPERIMENT 
1. Constant WINDOWLENGTH 
The next experiment was developed to answer question one above.  A constant 
traffic rate of approximately 2.4 kpps was used based on the results of the previous ex-
periment.  This rate was accomplished with a 300 user-per-second load on the Avalanche 
SMB software.  The experiment consisted of setting the WL, using Equation (6.3), to 
achieve an absolute packet count of 24 thousand packets per window.  The experiment 
was conducted four times, each with a different SR.  The SL was set, using Equation 
(6.1), to achieve an SR of 1, 5, 10, and then 20.  The setting and corresponding figures for 
each of the four experiment runs are shown in Table 4. 
WINDOWLENGTH SLIDELENGTH SR Figures 
10 10 1 Figure 12 a & b 
10 2 5 Figure 12 c & d 
10 1 10 Figure 13 a & b 
10 0.5 20 Figure 13 c & d 
Table 4 A table containing the configuration parameters for the constant WL rate 
experiment and the associated figures depicting the results.  
Comparing the eight figures listed in Table 4, it can be seen that they are dramati-
cally different.  If the response of the system was based on the absolute packet count, 
then each of these figures would look similar.  In actuality, these figures are similar to 
those in the section V.E rate experiment.  The figures with a low SR exhibit a lot of 
noise, as did the figures with low traffic rates.  The figures with the higher SRs approach 






Figure 12 Screen shots of the constant WL ratio experiment results – (a) Thermal 
Towers with SR = 1, (b) Thermal Canyon with SR = 1, (c) Thermal Towers with 






Figure 13 Screen shots of the constant WL ratio experiment results – (a) Thermal 
Towers with SR = 10, (b) Thermal Canyon with SR = 10, (c) Thermal Towers 
with SR = 20, (d) Thermal Canyon with SR = 2. 
a.  Conclusions 
It can be concluded that optimal system operation is based on the new 
packet count as opposed to absolute packet count.  Therefore, the SL must be set first to 
achieve the correct new packet count, and then the WL can be set to achieve the desired 
SR.  
2.  Constant SLIDELENGTH 
Given that the SL must be fixed, the next experiment explored question two from 
section V.E.1, of whether the optimal new packet count of 2 – 3 thousand packets per 
display period is valid for different SRs.  The experiment consisted of setting the SL to 
achieve a new packet count of 2.4 thousand packets per slide.  The experiment was con-
ducted four times, each with a different SR.  The WL was set to achieve an SR of 1, 5, 
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10, and then 20.  The setting and corresponding figures for each of the four runs of the 
experiments are shown in Table 5. 
WINDOWLENGTH SLIDELENGTH SR Figures 
1 1 1 Figure 14 a & b 
5 1 5 Figure 14 c & d 
10 1 10 Figure 15 a & b 
20 1 20 Figure 15 c & d 
Table 5 A table containing the configuration parameters for the constant SL rate 
experiment and the associated figures depicting the results. 
Comparing the eight figures listed in Table 5, it can be seen that they are dramati-
cally different.  If the response of the system was independent of the SR, then each of 
these figures would look similar.  The experiment results are as expected, given that the 
SR acts as a filter.  The figures with a low SR are very noisy, where the figures with the 





Figure 14 Screen shots of the constant SL ratio experiment results– (a) Thermal 
Towers with SR = 1, (b) Thermal Canyon with SR = 1, (c) Thermal Towers with 






Figure 15 Screen shots of the constant SL ratio experiment results– (a) Thermal 
Towers with SR = 10, (b) Thermal Canyon with SR = 10, (c) Thermal Towers 
with SR = 20, (d) Thermal Canyon with SR = 20 
a.  Conclusions 
It can be concluded that optimal system operation is dependent on the 
proper new packet count as well as the proper SR.  Once the SL is properly set, then the 
WL must be set to achieve the optimal SR.  For network traffic rates between 2 and 3 
kpps, an SR of approximately 10 results in an exceptional response from the Thermal 
Towers and Thermal Canyon graphs. 
G.  LOW DATA RATE EXPERIMENT 
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Given that not all networks have traffic levels between 2 and 3 kpps, this section 
explores configuration for lower data rates – specifically how the SL and WL parameters 
scale with lower traffic levels.  To accomplish this, a series of experiments were devel-
oped.  The first experiment checked the scalability of the SL.  The second experiment 
checked the scalability of the SR as well as the WL.  All experiments were performed 
using a traffic rate of 500 pps. 
1.  SLIDELENGTH Scaling Experiment 
The SL Scaling experiment was designed to explore the scalability of the SL pa-
rameter.  If a SL of 1 worked well for traffic rates of 2 to 3 kpps, then is there a scaling 
relation for other traffic rates?  If a scaling relationship exists, then it may not be linear.  
In Figure 16, curve ‘a’ shows an example of polynomial scaling and curve ‘b’ shows an 




A graphic depicting an example of polynomial (a) and linear (b) scaling. Figure 16 
For this experiment, the SL was varied from 3 to 5 and the WL was changed to 
ensure a SR of 10.  The values of SL, WL, SR, and the corresponding figures for each run 
of the experiment are outlined in Table 6. 
WINDOWLENGTH SLIDELENGTH SR Figures 
30 3 10 Figure 17 a & b 
40 4 10 Figure 17 c & d 
50 5 10 Figure 17 e & f 
Table 6 A table containing the configuration parameters of the low data SL scaling 
experiment and the associated figures depicting the results. 
If there existed a linear relationship between SL and traffic rate, then an SL value 
of 5 would produce the same results for a traffic rate of 500 pps as an SL of 1 did for a 
traffic rate of 2.5 kpps.  It can be seen in Figure 17(e) and (f) that this is not the case.  
When compared to Figure 13(a) and (b), it can be seen that they are dramatically differ-
ent.  The graphs in Figure 17(e) and (f) have been overly smoothed, thus resulting in lost 
information.  This would indicate that there is not a linear relationship.  One reason is that 
the transaction time does not change with the traffic rate.  The transaction time is a con-
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stant 3 ms; thus, for a longer SL, a larger percentage of transaction are completed as 








Figure 17 Screen shots of the low rate SL scale experiment results – (a) Thermal 
Towers with SL = 3, (b) Thermal Canyon with SL = 3, (c) Thermal Towers with 
SL = 4, (d) Thermal Canyon with SL = 4, (e) Thermal Towers with SL = 5, (f) 
Thermal Canyon with SL = 5 
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a.  Conclusions 
It appears that a less than linear relationship exists due to constant factors 
like transaction time.  The graphs in Figure 17(c) and (d) look the best out of that set, re-
sulting in an SL value of 4 seconds.  The next experiment looks at varying the SR with a 
constant SL.   
2.  Constant SLIDELENGTH Ratio Experiment 
This experiment was designed to explore the effects of changing the SR with a 
constant SL of 4 seconds.  The values of SL, WL, SR, and the corresponding figures for 
each run of the experiment are outlined in Table 7. 
WINDOWLENGTH SLIDELENGTH SR Figures 
16 4 4 Figure 18 a & b 
24 4 6 Figure 18 c & d 
32 4 8 Figure 18 e & f 
Table 7 A table containing the configuration parameters for the low rate constant 
SL ratio experiment and the associated figures depicting the results.  
It is clear that of the three sets of graphs in Figure 18, (e) and (f) are best configured for 
anomaly detection.  This corresponds to a WL of 32 seconds resulting in an SR of 8. 
a.  Conclusions 
Determining the SL, WL, and SR for traffic that is outside the optimal 2 to 
3 kpps range is not a simple task.  The scaling relationship is not a simple linear relation-
ship.  In fact, it is actually multidimensional, since the SL and the WL/SR were required 
to be changed by different factors.  While the SL increased by a factor of 4, the WL was 
increased by a factor of 3.2.  As a result, the SR was decreased by a factor of 0.8.  Due to 
constants that do not scale with traffic rate, like transaction time, there is a dimensional 
scaling component.  This dimensional scaling component increases the complexity of de-
termining SL, WL, and SR for traffic levels outside the optimal range.  As shown in 
Figure 18, it is possible to find an acceptable configuration for anomaly detection.  This 









Figure 18 Screen shots of the low rate const SL ratio experiment results – (a) Ther-
mal Towers with SR = 4, (b) Thermal Canyon with SR = 4, (c) Thermal Towers 
with SR = 6, (d) Thermal Canyon with SR = 6, (e) Thermal Towers with SR = 8, 




H.  WHOLE BUCKET EXPERIMENT 
All of the proceeding experiments were run with the same traffic configuration.  
This next section explores the effects of expanding the traffic configuration while keep-
ing the Therminator configuration parameters constant.  In the previous experiments, traf-
fic flowed between two sets of bucket pairs, thus only using four of the six buckets for 
normal traffic.  In this experiment, the system was tricked into thinking that some trusted 
clients were trusted servers and vice versa.  This produced traffic that flowed between 













Figure 19 A graphic representing the two conversation triplets in the whole bucket 
experiment.  Untrusted clients exchange data with untrusted servers and trusted 
clients exchange with untrusted servers.   
This configuration utilized all six buckets for normal traffic.  The traffic rate in the 
trusted buckets was approximately half that of the untrusted buckets.  The settings and 
corresponding figures for the three runs of the experiment are shown in Table 8.  All con-
figuration files used for this experiment are contained in Appendix A. 
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WINDOWLENGTH SLIDELENGTH SR Figures 
10 1 10 Figure 20a 
20 2 10 Figure 20b 
30 2 15 Figure 20c 
10 1 10 Figure 20d 
Table 8 A table containing the configuration parameters for the whole bucket ex-
periment and the associated figures depicting the results. 
This experiment produced some very interesting results, shown in Figure 20(a) 
and (d).  From the Thermal Towers, it can be seen that some buckets were properly 
smoothed, while others were very noisy.  The change in configuration caused the trusted 
traffic to be split between two buckets in each pair.  For example, in the previous experi-
ments, traffic flowed between the blue and green buckets as well as the yellow and or-
ange buckets.  The new traffic configuration caused traffic to flow between the blue, 
green, and magenta buckets as well as the yellow, orange, and red buckets.  The traffic 
that was going exclusively to the blue bucket is now split between the blue and magenta 
buckets.  This also holds for the yellow and red buckets.  This creates more than 100 
unique states, as seen in the overflow of the Thermal Canyon graph.  The Thermal Can-
yon graph did not change significantly in the other runs of the experiment, so it is only 
shown for the first experiment. 
The experiment was then repeated, increasing the SL and decreasing the WL (to 
keep the SR constant).  The results can be seen on Figure 20(b).  Increasing the SL 
caused the yellow and orange buckets, the two with the most traffic, to become overly 
smoothed.  The noise was slightly reduced in the other buckets, but overall there was lit-
tle improvement.  Next, the original SL was used, but the WL was increased to achieve a 
SR of 15.  The results of this experiment can be seen in Figure 20(c).  Again, the green 






Figure 20 Screen shots of the whole bucket experiment results – (a) Thermal Towers 
with SR = 10, (b) Thermal Towers with SR = 10, (c) Thermal Towers with SR = 
15, (d) Representative Thermal Canyon 
1. Conclusions 
From the results of the whole bucket experiment, it can be concluded that the 
proper SL setting depends on the distribution of traffic between the buckets.  For configu-
rations that have effectively equal traffic distribution between buckets, the SL and WL 
should be set as specified in the previous sections.  When the distribution of traffic is not 
close to being equal, then the SL and WL need to be set according to the highest priority 
buckets. For example, in the previous experiment, the SL and WL should be set as in 
Figure 20(c).  Since the information in the trusted buckets is of more concern than that of 
the untrusted buckets.  Chapter VI explores changing the bucket boundaries in order to 
overcome unequal traffic distribution between buckets. 
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I. SUMMARY 
The performance of Therminator is highly dependent upon proper configuration.  
The concept of a smoothing ratio, defined in Equation (6.1), has a filtering effect on the 
Therminator graphs.  It was shown in this chapter that for traffic levels within the range 
of 2 to 3 kpps an SL of one and an WL of ten (SR = 10) is ideal (given boundary condi-
tions listed in Table 3).  The effects of changing SL and the WL were also shown for traf-
fic rates within this ideal range.   
Given that it is not always possible to ensure that the network traffic is within the 
ideal range, the scaling of these values for lower traffic rates was explored.  It was shown 
that the values do not scale linearly, but more likely involve some sort of dimensional 
scaling function.  Proper setting of the SL and WL could be determined by trial and error 
for lower traffic rates.  In this case, the output is first optimized by setting the SL and 
then further optimized by adjusting the WL.  For traffic rates lower than the optimal 
range, the SL must be increased as well as the WL, but the resulting SR will be lower. 
Last, it was shown that these setting are based on the assumption that traffic is 
evenly distributed between buckets.  It was shown that when there are gross differences 
in the traffic distribution between buckets, then the graph cannot be optimized for every 
bucket.  In some cases this may be acceptable.  In Chapter VI, the BUCKETSPACEINIT 
configuration parameter set and optimizing a system with an unequal distribution of traf-
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VI. CONFIGURATION – BUCKETSPACEINIT  
A.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, the initial and boundary conditions for a bucket set are defined and 
explored.  This consists of several experiments that examine the effects of changing the 
initial and boundary conditions on the Therminator GUI.  The last section looks at opti-
mizing a system with unequal traffic distribution between buckets. 
B.  INITIAL AND BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 
The BUCKETSPACEINIT parameter set consists of the initial and boundary con-
ditions for the buckets within a given bucket space.  An example of a 
BUCKETSPACEINIT parameter set can be seen in Figure 21.   
BUCKETSPACEINIT SIXBUCKET
   (0): 0/10 : 4 
   (1): 0/10 : 4 
   (2): 0/10 : 4 
   (3): 0/10 : 4 
   (4): 0/10 : 4 
   (5): 0/10 : 4 
ENDBUCKETINIT
 
Figure 21 An example of the BUCKETSPACEININT Parameter set in the 
<name>.config file for the Therminator PID5 executable.  Each numbered line de-
fines the lower/upper boundary limits and the initial number of balls for a bucket. 
In the example above, the BUCKETSPACEINIT parameter set is named SIXBUCKET.  
It consists of six buckets, numbered from zero to five.  Each bucket has a set of boundary 
conditions and an initial condition.  In the example above, each bucket has the same 
boundary and initial conditions.  The first two numbers after the bucket number are the 
boundary conditions.  The boundary conditions consist of two limits.  The first is a lower 
boundary limit, or the minimum number of balls a bucket may contain.  The second is an 
upper limit, or the maximum number of balls a bucket may contain.  In this example, 
each bucket may contain a minimum of zero balls and a maximum of ten balls.  The next 
value is the initial condition, the initial number of balls the bucket contains.  For this ex-
ample, each bucket initially contains four balls.  The BUCKETSPACEINIT parameter set 
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can be found in the <name>.config file for the Therminator PID5 executable.  Appendix 
A contains an example of this file. 
 Exploring the boundary conditions is not as straight forward as it may seem.  Be-
sides the actual values of the boundary conditions, the relative distances between each of 
the boundary conditions are important.  There are three relative distances of importance.  
The first is the distance between the lower boundary and the initial condition.  The sec-
ond is the distance between the initial condition and the upper boundary.  The last is a 
function of the first two, the distance between the lower and upper boundary or the sum 
of the first two distances.  The initial and boundary conditions affect the size of the 
bucket state space.  The size (number of possible bucket states) is an important metric in 
optimizing Therminator performance.  
C. INITIAL CONDITION EXPERIMENT 
 This experiment was designed to explore the effects of changing the initial condi-
tion, the distances between the initial ball count and the minimum and maximum ball 
limits.  The distance between the boundary conditions remained constant, but the size of 
the bucket state space changes.  The same test traffic that was used in Chapter V was 
used for this experiment.  The configuration parameters used in this experiment are de-
fined in Table 9. 





1 second 10 seconds 10 0:10 2.4 kpps 
Table 9 A table containing the configuration parameters for the initial condition 
experiment. 
The initial condition was varied from 3 to 7 homogenously across the bucket 
space.  The size of the bucket state space and the corresponding figures for the results of 
each run of the experiment are contained in Table 10.  The symmetry of the bucket state 
space around the midpoint of the boundary condition (initial ball count equal to 5) is of 







3 49 Figure 22 a & b 
4 81 Figure 22 c & d 
5 121 Figure 22 e & f 
6 81 Figure 23 a & b 
7 49 Figure 23 c & d 
* Not counting states added by anomalous packet 
Table 10 A table containing the initial ball counts for the initial conditions experi-
ment and the associated figures depicting the results. 
A small value for the initial condition results in a very small bucket state space.  
Each possible bucket state is frequently visited during each display period.  This causes 
the Thermal Towers to become overly smooth, thus loosing information, as seen in 
Figure 22(a).  The Thermal Canyon graph has very little variation due to the limited 
number of possible bucket states, as seen in Figure 22(b). 
For an initial condition of 4, the graphs are the baseline configuration as explored 
in the previous chapter.  Conversations can been seen in the Thermal Towers, Figure 
22(c), and majority of the possible bucket states are being visited each display period, 
Figure 22(d), but not enough to saturate the graph.  These figures were put in for com-
parison purposes. 
An initial condition of 5 results in the maximum-size bucket state space.  It is half 
way between the lower limit of 0 and the upper limit of 10.  The conversations in the 
Thermal Towers are still apparent, as seen in Figure 22(e), although a subtle change oc-
curs towards a rougher appearance.  The change in the Thermal Canyon is the most no-
ticeable.  There is significantly more variability in the graph, Figure 22(f), as the system 
is allowed more possible bucket states.  This produces a graph that is more difficult to 
interpret, since some normal activity appears anomalous. 
In this configuration, there is symmetry about the midpoint initial condition of 5.  
Thus, the results for an initial condition of 6 are similar to those with an initial condition 






(e) (f)  
Figure 22 Screen shots of the initial conditions experiment results – (a) Thermal 
Towers with IC = 3, (b) Thermal Canyon with IC = 3, (c) Thermal Towers with 
IC = 4, (d) Thermal Canyon with IC = 4, (e) Thermal Towers with IC = 5, (d) 







Figure 23 Screen shots of the initial conditions experiment results – (a) Thermal 
Towers with IC = 6, (b) Thermal Canyon with IC = 6, (c) Thermal Towers with 
IC = 7, (d) Thermal Canyon with IC = 7. 
1. Conclusions 
The size of the bucket state space is a major factor in the performance of Thermi-
nator.  Changing the initial conditions has a dramatic effect on the bucket state space size.  
There is a symmetrical relationship for the initial conditions around the midpoint between 
the upper and lower boundary conditions.  Reducing the initial condition reduces the size 
of the bucket state space.  This has a similar effect as an increasing the traffic rate.  Con-
versely, increasing the initial condition creates a larger bucket state space and has a simi-
lar effect as decreasing the traffic rate.  These two rules are true for conditions below the 
point of symmetry and have the opposite effect above the symmetry point.  Homogenous 
changes in the initial conditions are an effective way to tune system performance.  Non-
homogenous changes within a conversation group do not make sense unless a total ball 
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count other than n  is desired.  The initial conditions should be kept homogenous be-
tween all buckets of a given conversation group.  Bucket groups that are not involved in 
the same conversations may have different initial conditions. 
*i
D. BOUNDARY CONDITIONS EXPERIMENT 
 This experiment was designed to explore the effects of changing the boundary 
conditions on the Therminator GUI.  Two aspects of boundary conditions were explored, 
homogenous and non-homogenous boundary conditions across the bucket space.  In the 
first experiment, all of the boundary conditions are changed equally across the bucket 
space; n the second, only one bucket’s boundary condition was changed.  As in the previ-
ous section, changes in the boundary conditions affect the size of the bucket state space.  
The configuration parameters defined in Table 11 were used for each run of the experi-
ment. 





1 second 10 seconds 10 4 2.4 kpps 
Table 11 A table containing the configuration parameters for the boundary condi-
tions experiment. 
1. Homogenous Boundary Conditions 
This experiment consisted of examining the effects of decreasing the distance be-
tween the boundary conditions homogeneously across the bucket space.  For the ease of 
comparison, a base case is included with each run of the experiment.  The initial and 
boundary conditions, size of the bucket state space, and corresponding figures for the re-
sults of each run are contained in Table 12. 
Lower Limit Upper limit Initial Ball Count 
Total 
States* Figures 
0 10 4 81 Figure 24 a & b 
1 9 4 49 Figure 24 c & d 
0 10 5 121 Figure 25 a & b 
1 9 5 81 Figure 25 c & d 
* Not counting states added by anomalous packet 
Table 12 A table containing the values of the boundary conditions for the homo-
genous boundary conditions experiment and the associated figures depicting the 
results. 
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The results displayed in Figure 24 (a) and (b) is used as a baseline for comparison 
to the results in Figure 24 (c) and (d).  The distance between the boundary conditions was 
decreased by 2 in Figure 24 (c) and (d), the resultant graph becoming smoother.  This was 
a similar effect to an increase in the traffic rate or decreasing the initial condition (assum-





Figure 24 Screen shots of the homogenous boundary conditions experiment results – 
(a) Thermal Towers with BC = 0/10 and IC = 4, (b) Thermal Canyon with BC = 
0/10 and IC = 4, (c) Thermal Towers with BC = 1/9 and IC = 4, (d) Thermal Can-
yon with BC = 1/9 and IC = 4. 
In fact, the configuration in Figure 24 (c) and (d) is identical to that of Figure 22 
(a) and (b).  There is a translation property associated with the boundary and initial condi-
tions.  Two BUCKETSPACEINIT parameter sets are equivalent if one set is a scalar 
translation of the other.  For example the BUCKETSPACEINIT parameter sets listed in 








0 10 4 
5 15 9 
Table 13 A table containing equivalent BUCKETSPACEINIT parameter sets.  One 
set is a scalar transform of the other. 
Repeating the experiment with another set of conditions, Figure 25 (a) and (b) is 
used as a baseline for comparison to the results in Figure 25 (c) and (d).  The distance 
between the boundary conditions was again decreased by 2 in Figure 25 (c) and (d) in 
hopes of producing a smoother response.  In fact, the configuration in Figure 25 (c) and 
(d) is identical to that of Figure 24 (a) and (b) based on the scalar translation property and 
the number of possible states as described below.  Table 14 lists the BUCKETSPACE-
INIT parameter sets for these sets of figures and the equivalency connection via the pa-
rameters in the middle row.  No experiment was conducted for the case described in the 







0 10 4 Figure 24 a & b 
0 8 4 N/A 
1 9 5 Figure 25 c & d 
Table 14 A table containing equivalent BUCKETSPACEINIT parameter sets.  The 
first row is equivalent to the second since a two bucket conversation of 8 balls 
will never reach the upper boundary of 10.  The third row is a scalar translation of 
the second row. 
The parameter sets in the first two rows are equivalent.  In this case, the conversa-
tion consists of two bucket pairs; therefore each conversation consists of 8 balls.  With 
only 8 balls, any upper limit above the total number of balls will be equivalent.  Rows 
two and three are then equivalent based on scalar translation.  The difference between the 
parameter sets in the first two rows would only become evident if more balls are added to 
the conversation as from an anomalous event for example.  In this case, the first row will 
produce a greater perturbation in the Thermal Canyon based on a larger bucket state 






Figure 25 Screen shots of the homogenous boundary conditions experiment results – 
(a) Thermal Towers with BC = 0/10 and IC = 5, (b) Thermal Canyon with BC = 
0/10 and IC = 5, (c) Thermal Towers with BC = 1/9 and IC = 5, (d) Thermal Can-
yon with BC = 1/9 and IC = 5. 
2. Non-homogenous Boundary Conditions 
This second experiment consisted of examining the effects of decreasing the dis-
tance between the boundary conditions for a single bucket.  The baseline case is depicted 
in Figure 24 (a) and (b).  The initial and boundary conditions and corresponding figures 
for the results of each run are contained in Table 15.  The first run consisted of reducing 
the boundary condition in both directions.  In the second run, only the upper boundary 
condition was reduced. 
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0 1 7 1 
1 – 5 0 10 
4 Figure 27a 
0 0 6 2 1 – 5 0 10 4 Figure 27b 
Table 15 A table containing the values of the boundary conditions for the non-
homogenous boundary conditions experiment and the associated figures depicting 
the results. 
In both cases, the results, depicted in Figure 26 were interestingly similar.  Both 
runs had the expected affect on the bucket with the reduced boundary conditions as seen 
in the previous section.  The unexpected result was the other bucket in the conversation 
being affected.  The blue bucket had the reduced boundary condition, but the green 
bucket was affected as well.  The green bucket was not affected as much as the blue 
bucket, but the effect was still significant. This experiment shows that a non-homogenous 






Figure 26 Screen shots of the non-homogenous boundary conditions experiment re-
sults – (a) Thermal Towers with BC0 = 1/7, BC1-5 = 0/10, IC = 4, (b) Thermal 
Canyon with BC0 = 1/7, BC1-5 = 0/10, IC = 4, (c) Thermal Towers with BC0 = 
0/6, BC1-5 = 0/10, IC = 4, (d) Thermal Canyon with BC0 = 0/6, BC1-5 = 0/10, IC = 
4. 
3. Conclusions 
Again, it is found that the size of the bucket state space is a major factor in the 
performance of Therminator.  Reducing the distance between the boundary conditions 
reduces the size of the bucket state space.  A reduction in the size of the bucket state 
space has a smoothing effect on the graph similar to increasing the traffic rate.  Changing 
the boundary conditions can be the equivalent of changing the initial conditions due to 
the scalar translation property.  Two BUCKETSPACEINIT parameter sets are equivalent 
if one is a scalar translation of another.  It is therefore important to reduce the BUCKET-
SPACEINIT parameter set by the largest scalar possible without resulting in a negative 
lower boundary condition.  This helps in understanding and ensuring the desired results 
53 
are obtained.  Last, non-homogenous values for boundary conditions affect the entire 
conversation group; therefore, a conversation group is the smallest autonomous unit of a 
bucket space.  The effect on the other buckets in the conversation group is not as pro-
nounced, but still significant.  Boundary conditions should be kept homogenous for all 
buckets involved in the same conversation group. 
E. UNEQUAL TRAFFIC DISTRIBUTION EXPERIMENT 
 This experiment was designed to explore the possibility of optimizing the Ther-
minator GUI for conditions in which traffic is unequally distributed among buckets 
within a conversation group.  This was accomplished by adjusting the boundary condi-
tions of individual buckets.  The experiment parameters were those used in the whole 
bucket experiment in Chapter V.H.  The key to optimizing this situation is in understand-
ing the conversation flows.  Figure 19 depicts the two conversation groups.  The traffic 
rate in the trusted buckets is approximately half that of the untrusted buckets, but each 
conversation group contains both high and low traffic rate buckets.  Therefore, in an at-
tempt to optimize the system across the bucket space, the boundary conditions for the 
trusted buckets were reduced.  The results of the non-homogenous boundary conditions 
experiment would imply that this will not achieve the desired results, but it was hoped 
that the effect on the lower traffic buckets would be more significant than the collateral 
effect on the higher traffic buckets.  The experiment parameters defined in Table 16 
where used for each run of the experiment. 
 







1 0 - 5 1 10 10 0 10 4 Figure 27a 
0 - 3 1 9 5 2 4 - 5 1 10 10 0 12 5 Figure 27b 
0 - 3 1 9 5 3 4 - 5 1 12 12 0 12 5 Figure 27c 
Table 16 A table containing the values of the initial and boundary conditions for the 
unequal traffic distribution experiment and the associated figures depicting the re-
sults. 
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The first run establishes the base case for comparison, as seen in Figure 27(a).  In 
the second run, optimization was attempted by reducing the boundary conditions for the 
lower rate buckets and increasing the boundaries for the higher rate buckets.  The initial 
condition was also increased by one to provide a sufficient number of balls in the system.  
The results are depicted in Figure 27(b).  The response in the Thermal Towers is still very 
rough in the lower rate buckets, but improved for the higher rate buckets.  The third run 
improved the response by increasing the WL and thus the SR.  This proved to produce a 
nice graph that would be effective in anomaly detection.  In order to achieve this, all of 
the configuration parameters had to be modified.  It is questionable whether the effort 
produces a configuration that is any better from that used in Chapter V.H that resulted in 
Figure 20(c).  The question of how important the data in the high rate buckets are is vital 
in optimizing the system.  In this case, the data is related to the untrusted network, and 






Figure 27 Screen shots of the unequal traffic distribution experiment results – (a) 
Thermal Towers with BC = 0/10, IC = 4, and SR = 10, (b) Thermal Towers with 
BC0-3 = 1/9, BC4-5 = 0/10, IC = 5, and SR = 10, (c) Thermal Towers with BC0-3 = 
1/9, BC4-5 = 0/10, IC = 5, and SR = 12, (d) Representative Thermal Canyon. 
1. Conclusions 
With the smallest autonomous unit of a bucket space being a conversation group, 
the important relation becomes the size of the bucket state space within a conversation 
group.  It is possible to improve the response of a system that has a non-homogenous traf-
fic rate between buckets within the same conversation group.  The process is difficult and 
requires manipulation of all the configuration parameters.  It is questionable whether this 
provides any benefit over optimizing the configuration for the most important buckets. 
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F. SUMMARY 
 This chapter looked at the effects of altering the BUCKETSPACEINIT configura-
tion parameter set.  There were three sets of experiments conducted, exploring the initial 
conditions, boundary conditions, and the case of unequal traffic distribution across the 
bucket space.  Any changes in the initial or boundary conditions affect the size of the 
bucket state space.  The results of changing the size of the bucket state space were similar 
to those for changing the traffic rate. This implies a strong relationship between the size 
of the bucket state space and traffic rate.  Last, it was determined that the smallest unit 
within a bucket space is a conversation group.  Any changes to the initial or boundary 
conditions of a bucket affect all the buckets within the conversation group.  It was found 
to be of little value to have non-homogenous initial or boundary conditions within a con-
versation group.  The next chapter presents ideas to guide the creation of bucket spaces.  
These ideas were developed from observations made while conducting the experiments in 
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VII. CONFIGURATION – BUCKETSPACE 
A.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, the BUCKETSPACE configuration parameters are defined.  In 
addition, various ideas are expressed about configuring bucket spaces.  Ideas formulated 
while performing and analyzing the results of the experiments in Chapters V and VI are 
presented.  Last, the response of the system to anomalous packets is discussed. 
B. INTRODUCTION 
The BUCKETSPACE configuration parameters are what determine the decision 
tree and ultimately the bucket categories or bucket space.  The settings for the 
BUCKETSPACE parameters can be found in the Therminator’s executable 
<name>.config file.  An example of this file can be found in Appendix A.  The bucket 
space determines how the network participants are parsed and plays a critical role in op-
timizing the Therminator’s performance.  There settings are highly variable and depend 
largely on the traffic specifics of interest.  For example, there can be multiple instances of 
Therminator running at one time, each displaying a different aspect of network traffic.  
One could be configured for the overall traffic on the network, one for DNS traffic, an-
other for ICMP traffic, and lastly, one for web traffic.  Each instance would require a dif-
ferent BUCKETSPACE configuration.  The purpose of this chapter is to present some of 
the ideas that were discovered about BUCKETSPACE configuration while performing 
and analyzing the results of the experiments in Chapters V and VI.  An in-depth look into 
BUCKETSPACE configuration is left for follow-on work. 
C. TRAFFIC DISTRIBUTION 
The expected traffic rate distribution between buckets should be equalized if pos-
sible and, at a minimum, within a conversation group.  As seen in Chapter V.H and VI.E, 
when traffic is not equally distributed between buckets, the whole system becomes expo-
nentially more difficult to configure.  If the traffic cannot be parsed equally between 
buckets, then there are two possible solutions.  The first solution is to assign a priority 
rating to each bucket based on the criticality of the information it contains.  The system is 
then optimized for the highest priority buckets.  The second solution is to tailor each 
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bucket’s boundary conditions based on the expected level of traffic as explored in Chap-
ter VI.  This last method is only effective for unequal traffic distribution between conver-
sation groups.  Bucket prioritization is required for unequal traffic distribution within a 
conversation group. 
D. DETECTING ANOMALIES 
As stated in Chapter II, an anomaly can cause one of two effects in the Thermal 
Canyon graph.  Either new states are visited, or previously visited states are seen more 
often.  The first effect will cause a spike oriented along the z-axis and the latter along the 
y-axis.  An anomaly that is orthogonal to the normal traffic flow will tend to cause a 
spike oriented along the z-axis, due to the new states visited.  An anomaly that is parallel 
to the normal traffic flow will tend to cause a spike oriented along the y-axis, due to the 
revisiting of previously visited states.  The magnitude of the potential spike is what de-
termines the ability of the operator to detect the anomaly.  The orientation of the anomaly 
with respect to the normal traffic flow will determine the magnitude of the perturbation.  
A single packet anomaly that is orthogonal to the normal traffic flow will cause a large 
perturbation in the graph, where a packet that is parallel to the normal traffic flow will 
cause a relatively small perturbation.  The less orthogonal the anomaly is to the normal 
traffic flow, the larger the number of anomalous packets required to cause a noticeable 
perturbation in the graph.   
For example, Figure 28(a) represents all of the possible bucket states that are con-
tained in the bucket state space for a system consisting of three buckets (a, b, and c) each 
containing four balls.  Each of the blue nodes represents a different bucket state.  The 
number of balls in a given bucket is given by the lines parallel to the side opposite the 
vertex of interest.  Each of the vertices corresponds to the case where all of the balls are 
in the associated bucket.  The purple node represents the initial ball distribution, or initial 
bucket state of { .  In Figure 28(b), the number of balls in bucket ‘c’ is constant at 
four.  The thick green line represents the nine possible bucket states based on a conversa-










Figure 28 Graphics that depict the total bucket state space for a system containing 
three buckets each with four balls.  Each node corresponds to a different bucket 
state. – (a) The purple node corresponds to the bucket state of { . (b) The 
green line represents the range of possible bucket states for a conversation be-
tween buckets ‘a’ and ‘b’. 
4, 4,4}
An example of the results of a single packet anomaly, that is orthogonal to the 
normal traffic flow, can be seen in Figure 29.  In this case the packet caused a ball to 
move from bucket ‘c’ into the conversation between buckets ‘a’ and ‘b’.  The result is a 
new line of possible bucket states.  This new line contains ten possible bucket states.  
Given that the data from any given SL is averaged over a WL of time, there are now 
nineteen possible bucket states, which is more than double the original number of nine.  
This results in a run out (in the z-axis direction) of the Thermal Canyon graph.  This type 








Figure 29 A graphic depicting the results of an anomalous packet that is orthogonal 
to the normal traffic flow.  The anomalous packet causes a ball to move from 
bucket ‘c’ into the conversation between buckets ‘a’ and ‘b’.  The results is the 
state walk moves from the line at c 4=  to the line at c . 3=
Given that the Thermal Towers graph displays the average ball count per bucket 
per SL time period, it is less sensitive to anomalies that represent only a small percentage 
of the traffic.  The Thermal Towers graph shows significant changes in the traffic flow.  
Therefore, if an anomaly is to be noticed in the Thermal Towers, it must comprise an ap-
preciable percentage of the total traffic in the affected buckets.  For example, a few pack-
ets that are parallel to the normal traffic flow of 500 pps will not be seen, but if the pack-
ets are orthogonal to the normal traffic flow, regardless of traffic rate, they will be seen. 
The more orthogonal anomalous traffic is to the normal traffic flow, the greater 
effect the anomaly will have on the Therminator graphs.  Since it is not possible to know 
all the expected anomalous traffic in advance, the key is to create a bucket space that 
provides tight classification of critical traffic.  For example, traffic should be parsed by 
functional group, like web servers, as opposed to grouping servers and clients together.  
There is a limit to the number of buckets a configuration can have.  Ideally, multiple in-
stances of Therminator should be run concurrently to allow for smaller bucket spaces.  
This is also beneficial in reducing the complexity of interpreting the graphs which in-
creases with the number of buckets. 
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E.  SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the BUCKETSPACE configuration parameters were defined as 
the categorization parameters that makeup a bucket space.  Configurations resulting in 
unequal traffic distribution required either bucket prioritization or non-homogenous ini-
tial and boundary conditions.  Last, anomalous traffic has one of two possible effects on 
the system, depending upon the orientation to the normal traffic flow.  There is either an 
increase in the number of unique states visited or an increase in the number of times a 
given state is visited.  The next chapter summarizes the findings from this study and pre-
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VIII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides a summary of the findings of this study.  Included in the 
summary are conclusions from observations made during the execution of this study.  
Suggestions for future and follow-on work are also presented. 
B. SUMMARY 
The first part of this study involved defining the bucket state space.  Equations 
were developed for state counting to determine the size of bucket state space.  These 
equations presented in Chapter III are necessary in understanding how to properly con-
figure the Therminator.  Next, the concept of a SR was developed to define the averaging 
time for data within the Therminator statistical mechanics algorithm.  It was determined 
that a low SR results in increased false positives and a high ratio results in increased false 
negatives. 
In exploring the SL, it was determined that the display period, which is equal to 
the SL, should be set based on the traffic rate.  A relationship between the display period 
and traffic rate was not able to be empirically determined, but was found to be less than 
linear.  It was also determined that optimizing a system for a reduced traffic rate would 
require a less than linear increase in the SL.  The WL would also increase, but not as 
much as the SL.  This results in a decrease in the SR. 
It was determined that the SL and WL settings affect the bucket space as a sys-
tem.  Not all systems will have even traffic distribution across the bucket space.  For 
situations with uneven traffic distributions, optimization can be achieved by changing the 
BUCKETSPACEINIT parameters.  The smallest grouping within a bucket space was de-
termined to be a conversation group.  Uneven traffic distributions within a conversation 
group could not be optimized by changing the BUCKETSPACEINIT parameters.  In this 
case, a bucket prioritization scheme must be used.  For uneven traffic distribution be-
tween conversation groups, optimization could be achieved by changing the 
BUCKETSPACEINIT parameters.  In this case, non-homogenous boundary conditions 
could optimize the system. 
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In experiments conducted on varying the BUCKETSPACEINIT parameters, it 
was determined that reducing the size of the bucket state space had a similar effect to in-
creasing the traffic rate.  In addition, the size of the bucket state space was symmetrical 
about the midpoint of the boundary conditions, assuming homogeneity across the bucket 
space with respect to the BUCKETSPACEINIT parameters.  also, a translation property 
was discovered with the BUCKETPSACEINIT parameters.  Two BUCKETSPACEINIT 
parameter sets were equivalent if one was a scalar translation of the other. 
Lastly, the idea of orthogonal traffic was developed.  The ability to detect anoma-
lous traffic was determined to be based on the quantity of packets and their orientation to 
the normal traffic flow.  The more anomalous packets received and/or the more orthogo-
nal the traffic is to the normal traffic, the larger the perturbation in the Therminator GUI 
and thus a greater chance of being detected.  
C. FUTURE WORK 
This study explored two of the three major areas of Therminator configuration, 
the SL/WL and the BUCKETSPACEINIT.  Ideas were presented for configuring the 
BUCKETSPACE, but no experiments were conducted.  Properly configuring BUCK-
ETSPACEs is a very complex task.  The resultant bucket space is affected by the settings 
for the SL/WL and the BUCKETSPACEINIT.  Further research could be conducted in 
the area of constructing bucket spaces. 
This study showed that a relationship exists between the size of the bucket state 
space and the traffic rate.  Further research could be conducted in determining the exact 
nature of this relationship.  This examination may help to better quantify the relationship 
between the SLIDELENGTH and the traffic rate.   
Most of this study was conducted using a simple bucket space and simple traffic 
consisting of HTTP exchanges.  This was done to reduce the variability in conditions un-
der which a basic understanding of the parameters could be gained.  Further research 
could be conducted by looking at the response of more complex bucket spaces and traffic 





The following is a representative <name>.config file for the Therminator PID5 executa-
ble used in all of the four bucket experiments. 
# This is a standard Config file for the Thermal IDS Package 
# 
# NOTE: NO SINGLE LINE CAN BE GREATER THAN 256 CHARACTERS IN 
LENGTH 
# 
# <Gratuitous MetaPlot example>               
#  MASTERFILE FROM 2001.04.25.04:35:00+299 CHOOSE (SPORT[0|8] 
DPORT[0|8])   
#  CHOOSE (PROTO[ICMP]) CHOOSE (SIZE[28]) PLOT SIPvDIP EXPORT 
/tmp/b.out WITH TABS 
# </Gratuitous MetaPlot example> 
# 
 













# Begin Element Lists 
IPLIST TRUSTED 
  172.16.*.* 
ENDLIST 
 
IPLIST WEBSRVR  
  172.16.10.110 
  172.16.10.111 
  172.16.10.112 
  172.16.10.113 
  172.16.10.114 
  172.16.20.115 
  172.16.20.116 
  172.16.20.117 
  172.16.20.118 
  172.16.20.119 








#  Bucket Space Initialization and Boundary Definitions 
 
BUCKETSPACEINIT SIXBUCKET 
   (0): 0/10 : 4 
   (1): 0/10 : 4 
   (2): 0/10 : 4 
   (3): 0/10 : 4 
   (4): 0/10 : 4 




    (TRUSTED)  ? ($1):($2) 
    (WEBSRVR)  ? ($3):($4) 
    (SERVICES) ? (4):(5) 
    (SERVICES) ? (0):(1) 
 
    (SERVICES) ? (2):(3) 
ENDBUCKET 
 
# Bucket Space Run Statements 
RUN SB WITH SIXBUCKET 
The following is a representative <name>.config file for the Therminator PID5 executa-
ble used in all of the six bucket experiments. 
# This is a standard Config file for the Thermal IDS Package 
# 
# NOTE: NO SINGLE LINE CAN BE GREATER THAN 256 CHARACTERS IN 
LENGTH 
# 
# <Gratuitous MetaPlot example>               
#  MASTERFILE FROM 2001.04.25.04:35:00+299 CHOOSE (SPORT[0|8] 
DPORT[0|8])   
#  CHOOSE (PROTO[ICMP]) CHOOSE (SIZE[28]) PLOT SIPvDIP EXPORT 
/tmp/b.out WITH TABS 
# </Gratuitous MetaPlot example> 
# 
 













# Begin Element Lists 
IPLIST TRUSTED 




IPLIST WEBSRVR  
  172.16.10.110 
  172.16.10.113 
  172.16.10.114 
  172.16.20.117 
  172.16.20.118 
  172.16.20.120   







#  Bucket Space Initialization and Boundary Definitions 
BUCKETSPACEINIT SIXBUCKET 
   (0): 1/10 : 4 
   (1): 1/10 : 4 
   (2): 1/10 : 4 
   (3): 1/10 : 4 
   (4): 0/10 : 4 
   (5): 0/10 : 4 
ENDBUCKETINIT 
 
#  Bucket Space Definitions 
BUCKETSPACE SB 
    (TRUSTED) ? ($1):($2) 
    (WEBSRVR) ? ($3):($4) 
    (SERVICES) ? (4):(5) 
    (SERVICES) ? (0):(1) 
    (SERVICES) ? (2):(3) 
ENDBUCKET 
 
# Bucket Space Run Statements 
RUN SB WITH SIXBUCKET 
The following is the sucker.conf file for the Therminator PID5 executable used in all of 
the experiments. 






#Perform matching if set to 1; otherwise set to 0 
MATCH 1 
 
#Number of slides to keep in memory to perform matching 
#  see SLIDE_LEN below. 
MATCH_TIME 5 
 




#How many seconds the friend will remain in memory 
FRIEND_TIME 3600 
INT_FRIEND_TIME 1200  
 
#How many seconds the friend bit will be set 




#How often (seconds) the sensor will send data to the RTDC 
 SLIDE_LEN 1 
 





The following is the sensor.config file for the Therminator sucker executable used in all 
of the experiments. 










SENSOR_DESC tape  
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